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Abstract: The  article  addresses  the  question  of  the  respect  owed  to 
believers  and  their  faiths  and  states  that  a  demand for  respect  for  the 
person of the believer does not imply a demand for respect for their faith. 
However,  being  'respect'  a  complex  and  ambiguous  notion,  the  article 
studies some arguments that go in the direction of justifying the move from 
respect  for  persons to respect  for  their  beliefs.  According to Habermas, 
there is a respect citizens of a democracy owe each other that requires 
taking each other's opinions seriously, including their religiously motivated 
opinions.  What is more, Habermas claims that we all  have something to 
learn from each other. The articles argues against this line of thought and 
states  there  is  no  obligation  to  respect  anything  about  people's  moral 
claims  except  their  right  to  make  them.  The  article  argues  against 
Habermas's  approach  by  showing  its  epistemological  and  ontological 
inconsistency  and  concludes  that  respect  for  persons  as  moral  reason-
givers or as fellow-citizens does not lead to any substantial respect for the 
contents of their claims.
Keywords:  respect,  secular  citizens  vs.  religious  citizens,  Habermas, 
religion. 
Resumen:  El artículo aborda la cuestión del respeto que se debe a los 
creyentes  y  sus  creencias  y  afirma que  la  demanda de  respeto  por  la 
persona del creyente no implica una demanda de respeto por su fe. Sin 
embargo, al ser el "respeto" una noción compleja y ambigua, el artículo 
analiza algunos de los argumentos que van en la dirección de justificar el 
desplazamiento del respeto a las personas al respeto por sus creencias. 
Según Habermas, hay un respeto que los ciudadanos de una democracia 
se  deben  entre  sí  que  requiere  tomar  las  opiniones  del  otro  en  serio, 
incluyendo  sus  opiniones  religiosas.  Y  aún  más,  Habermas  afirma que 
todos tenemos algo que aprender unos de otros. El artículo se opone a 
esta línea de pensamiento y afirma que no hay obligación de respetar nada 
acerca de las afirmaciones morales de las personas, salvo su derecho a 
hacerlas.  El  artículo  argumenta  en  contra  de  enfoque  de  Habermas, 
mostrando su inconsistencia epistemológica y ontológica, y concluye que el 
respeto a las personas como sujetos capaces de dar razones morales o 
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como conciudadanos no lleva aparejado ningún respeto sustancial por los 
contenidos de sus declaraciones.
Palabras  clave: respeto,  ciudadanos  seculares  frente  a  ciudadanos 
religiosos, Habermas, religión.
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1- Respect Creep or Habermas on What Atheists Owe the 
Religious
The still  simmering  “Ground  Zero  Mosque”  controversy  in  the  US 
shows the tangled threads of thinking about the very idea of respect where 
it is sometimes hard to distinguish whether opposing or supporting building 
a  'mosque'  is  a  matter  of  respecting  or  disrespecting  Moslem  persons, 
respecting or disrespecting their religion or respecting or disrespecting their 
citizen rights1. 
Some demonize Islam. This certainly shows disrespect for a system 
of religious beliefs or perhaps rather for some systems of religious belief as 
there are different denominations of Islam as there are in Christianity and 
other religious systems. These anti-Islamic attitudes may be unfair, they are 
certainly usually ill-informed and prejudiced. On these grounds it would be 
wrong to hold this or any religious belief-system in disrepute. But is it wrong 
to  hold  a  religious  belief-system  in  disrepute  because  doing  so  shows 
disrespect  for  the people who believe in  it? Answering yes is a form of 
respect creep: respect me, respect my religion. 
As  applied  to  religion,  Blackburn  describes  respect  creep  as  the 
movement from a demand for respect for the person of the believer to a 
demand for respect for the faith of the believer (Blackburn 2007). I think 
Blackburn  is  right,  respect  creep is  an error.  The temptation  to  respect  
creep is almost irresistible to thinkers who take respect for persons as a 
prime principle  of  relationship  with other  people.  The slide  whereby the 
expectation of "minimal toleration turns into a demand for more substantial 
1 The  confusing  controversy  broke  out  in  May  2010  when  plans  to  build  an 
Islamic  community  center,  called  the  'Cordoba House'  or  'Park51',  near  so-
called  'Ground  Zero',  site  of  the  9/11  attacks  in  New  York  City,  became 
generally  known.  The  Islamic  Center  was quickly  dubbed the  'Ground Zero 
Mosque' even though it is not a mosque – it is an interfaith community center – 
and it is not at 'Ground Zero'. At the time a majority of Americans felt it was 
offensive to build a center inspired by Islam so near a place where thousands 
were murdered by “Islamic terrorists” regardless of the fact many of the victims 
were themselves Muslims. Some anti-Islamic feeling is also part of the mix. 
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respect," as Blackburn puts it,  is slick but slanted. We have the anxious 
thought that [A] disrespect for a person's religious belief entails disrespect 
for the person; after all, unlike many other manners of belief, religious belief 
seems to reflects on the person and character of the believer – we can take 
believers' word for this as they assert their sincere faith is central to who 
they are. Then we have the praiseworthy thought that we owe persons a 
baseline respect. So we shouldn't disrespect people's faith; [B] respect for 
the person entails respect for their religious belief. 
I  do  think  [A]  is  true  and  so  I  agree  people  have  reason  to  feel 
personally  aggrieved  if  you  dismiss  their  beliefs  as  foolishness  or 
regressive (even if ever so politely). But trying to resist disrespect for the 
person whose beliefs you deplore entails an unreasonable psychological 
burden.  Of  course,  there  are  exculpatory  circumstances,  for  instance, 
culturally ingrained ignorance or prejudice, but that's the point, exculpation 
is appropriate. Suppose you are a secularist who cannot help but be wary 
of  fundamentalist  willingness  to  codify  religious  sentiment  into  law;  you 
must  see this not  only  as an intellectual  mistake but  also a moral  flaw, 
perhaps a failing of character. Or the skeptic may find the dogma of the 
devout foolish and find the devout culpable for it; and so on. The religionist 
may find the secularist's 'relativism' morally lukewarm about values the law 
should  revere  and  fervently  protect;  the  devout  may  chide  or  pity  the 
skeptic's modernist lack of moorings. It hardly seems reasonable to forbid 
people  their  sentiments  of  mutual  abhorrence;  it's  not  psychologically 
possible except at the price of nearly inhuman self-overcoming or human, 
all-too human bad faith.
Moreover,  unpleasant  as it  is,  it  is  not  wrong to cause this  injury, 
aggrievement at your disdain for them for their beliefs; no one is owed this 
kind of respect, no one is shielded from this disdain. (Of course, expressing 
it  is  another  matter2.)  The  problem  is  that  'respect'  is  a  complex  and 
2 “The mere fact that any prudent man finds it necessary to conceal a good part  
of his thoughts makes it clear enough that every member of our race is well  
advised  to  be  on  his  guard  and  not  to  reveal  himself  completely.”  Kant, 
Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, p. 192. 
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ambiguous notion, one must attend carefully to its registers. We can see 
this by looking at some arguments that go in the direction of justifying the 
move from respect for persons to respect for their beliefs which I want to 
address here. 
I want to look at the following theses which structure the paper. 
(1)  There  is  what  I  call  the Habermas/Darwall  line  that  respecting 
persons entails respecting the moral claims they make, perhaps this would 
bring  us  a  step  closer  to  having  to  respect  the  moral  content  of  their 
religious  beliefs  too.  The trouble is,  it's  wrong;  there is  no obligation  to 
respect  anything about  people's  moral  claims except  their  right  to make 
them. 
(2)  Habermas  has  fielded  an  interesting  argument  that  there  is  a 
respect citizens of a democracy owe each other that requires taking each 
other's opinions seriously,  including their religiously motivated opinions. I 
think this goes too far as a requirement even if it an attractive moral ideal of 
deliberative democracy. 
(3) Habermas has extended this line to the suggestion that secular 
citizens must take religious opinions seriously even to the point of being 
prepared to learn from them. The trouble with this  idea is the sense in 
which it is right is trivial, and the sense in which it is not trivial conflicts, I 
think, with Habermas's own meta-ethical views. 
I will look at (1) and (2) in the immediately following sections of the 
paper  and  (3)  gets  addressed  in  the  two  sections  on  sources  of 
ambivalence. The upshot is, “You can't get there from here.” I don't see 
how respect for persons as moral reason-givers or as fellow-citizens leads 
to any substantial  respect  for  their  actual  opinions  or  even for  them as 
individuals. And though there may be a route that leads to the hypothesis 
that the non-religious have something to learn from the religious,  I think 
Habermas's own theoretical premises bar him from it. 
2- Respect for Persons, Respect for Citizens
Is there a relation between respecting a person and respecting their 
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beliefs? We can deploy Darwall's famous distinction between  recognition 
respect and  appraisal  respect (Darwall  2004).  The  former  applies  to  a 
person insofar as they occupy a role or bear a characteristic because of 
which you defer to them. I  defer  to  parents who shout  at  their  children 
because  however  much  I  may  disapprove,  they  have  'standing'  as  the 
parents of the children which I lack. I defer to the authority of the judge at 
law even if I despise him as a drunken fool but it is his court. I defer to my 
fellow-citizens who have a right to voice their opinions even if I consider 
them benighted because of those opinions. I have  recognition respect  for 
their standing as parents, as officers of the court, as fellow-citizens, but do 
not  regard  the  persons  themselves  very  highly,  I  have  low  appraisal  
respect for them3.
Can  we  find  in  this  kind  of  respect  a  moral  basis  respecting 
individuals  as  persons?  In  more  recent  work  Darwall  argues  we  owe 
persons a kind of respect simply for being 'persons' for as 'persons' they 
have dignity  parsed as the standing to make potentially warranted moral 
claims (Darwall 2004). This is analogous to treating the judge according to 
the 'dignity'  of  his  'standing'  or  position even if  we contemn him for  his 
personal behavior:  each person has a certain standing even if  we reject 
aspects  of  their  behavior.  Darwall's  approach  is  very  similar  to  the 
Communicative Ethics or Discourse Ethics which Habermas has developed 
since the 70's; Habermas argues that each individual has standing to raise 
moral validity-claims  and  finds  the  basis  for  this  standing  in  the 
presuppositions of discourse: speech with one another about what is right 
and  wrong  logically  (by  illocutionary  implicature)  presupposes  we  are 
warranted to address claims to one another4.
Let  us  assume  that  Habermas  and/or  Darwall's  views  about  the 
3 Some distinguish respect from esteem, finding value in other people and in their 
conceptions.  On  the  distinction  between  the  respect and  the  esteem 
conceptions of toleration, see Forst 2002, Chapter 2. See also Forst's article 
entitled  Toleration in  the  online  Standard  Encyclopedia  of  Philosophy 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/toleration/#FouConTol>,  original  version  of 
February 23, 2007.
4 Recent statements of the view can be found in Habermas (1995 & 1999).
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standing to raise moral claims are right. What have we gained? Respect for 
people in the sense of respecting their standing to raise moral claims is 
perfectly consistent with contempt for them and for their views, indeed, in 
one sense, it is a precondition of it. Moral contempt only makes sense as 
aimed at persons so, accepting the Darwall/Habermas line, moral contempt 
only makes sense as aimed at beings who have 'standing'. It is what they 
say (and do) in that standing that merits our disfavor.
Consider that the fact that I am obligated to take seriously a claim 
does  not  imply  that  I  am  obligated  to  accept  it.  I  may  find  the  claim 
unjustified in many serious ways. Habermas's  discourse ethics lays down 
the obligation  to justify one's  claims but  it  is  relatively  silent  about  what 
happens when this justification fails. To use Darwall's example, as I press 
my heavy foot on your tender toe, I may seriously consider your claim that I 
should (morally speaking) cease and desist -- and reject it. I have satisfied 
this elementary duty of respect. We obviously need to know a lot more: we 
need to know what counts as good or bad justification. (In addition, to have 
practical effect, we have to agree about the duty.) The structure of basic 
respect sheds no light on the acceptability of the content of the claims.
So  the  Darwall/Habermas  approach  yields  a  very  thin  concept  of 
respect5. It only seems to have more motive force because one imagines 
some  moral  background  conditions.  For  instance  and  especially  one 
imagines  that  one  is  addressing  people  one  considers  worthy  on  other 
grounds than the mere fact they have the moral standing to express moral 
opinions. One imagines they are not simply benighted, one imagines there 
is plausibility in what they say, etc. etc. 
So there is a breach between respecting people persons, respecting 
them as good persons, and respecting their views and beliefs. Perhaps we 
can  go  further  if  we  fill  in  some  background  conditions.  The  'Mosque' 
5 Still this is not nothing: it establishes that persons have the status to express 
their opinions and, other things being equal, to live according to them. (Some 
students of Habermas want to add positive duties to support others' will to live 
according  to  their  opinions,  the  so-called  Prinzip  der  Betroffenheit.)  “Other 
things being equal.” Therein lies the rub. In the cases that matter, they are not  
equal.
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controversy opened some common ground between the proponents and 
the opponents as most agreed that the sponsors had a right to build the 
Islamic  center.  The  opponents  argued  that  it  would  offend  legitimate 
sensitivities  if  they  did  build  it,  the  proponents  either  granted  the 
sensitivities were legitimate but outweighed by other considerations or held 
them  for  expressions  of  prejudice  or  misinformation.  But  the  common 
ground is precisely the 'ground zero' of  recognition respect, applied to the 
role of  citizens marking the minimal  deference citizens owe their  fellow-
citizens in the exercise of their citizen rights even as they disapprove of the 
vices of their judgment, even of their character. So we must respect fellow-
citizens' opinions in the sense that we respect their right to them. Perhaps 
citizenship in a shared democratic order is a moral background condition 
that  would  serve  to  support  an  obligation  to  respect  persons  qua 
democratic  citizens  and  links  it  to  respect  for  their  moral  and  religious 
opinions. We'll come to that in the following section. For now the point is 
that  respect  based  on  your  status  as  reason-giver  does  not  reach  to 
respect for persons as good reason-givers, or even good people. We need 
another argument for that. Perhaps appeal to their status as fellow-citizens 
in a democracy will do.
3- Democracy and Learning from Religion
Habermas urges that  life  in  democratic  community  obligates  us to 
take seriously the claims our fellow-citizens make on us for the validity of 
their religious beliefs, indeed he argues the secularist must at least start 
with the assumption there is something to learn from religious belief. (It is 
unclear what happens if this assumption is defeated.)6 This is indeed an 
instance  of  respect  creep but  perhaps  it  is  justified?  For  Habermas 
democracy is  about  considering what  we can do to accommodate each 
other's needs and interests which we can know and prioritize only through 
6 See  for  instance,  Habermas  2005.  His  initial  motivation  is  a  concern  with 
fairness of burden: since the language of the public square is secular (in secular 
democracies), the religious are at a disadvantage. But alleviating this burden 
requires the thought that the religious actually have something to contribute.
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deliberation.  (Analytically)  democracy  is  about  what  each  of  us  wants, 
individually and collectively, so (ideally) each voice counts. 
It is true that this democratic principle of respect implies that we must 
take seriously  what  our  fellow-citizens say and further,  that  we all  have 
something  to  learn  from each  other.  But  what  it  implies  we  in  the  first 
instance  have  to  learn  is  what  everyone  wants.  Deliberation  yields 
information about the distribution of desires. And this involves an element 
of  translation:  mutual  interpretation  of  what  people  are saying and what 
they mean. There is a bias for the secular here if, as is the case in liberal  
democracies,  the  language  of  the  public  sphere  is  secular,  thus  the 
religious  cannot  find  their  tongue.  As  several  have  pointed  out,  and 
Habermas concurs,  there is  inequality  of  hermeneutic  burdens:  religious 
folk must learn to speak secular even if it goes deeply against the grain, 
while  the  secular  can  comfortably  speak  as  they  are  wont.  Habermas 
covers this angle by obligating secular citizens to play Aaron to the religious 
citizens' Moses: the former are to 'translate' the claims of the latter in the 
secular public forum. But he cannot mean that all that secularists have to 
learn  from  religionists  is  what  the  religionists  want!  That  is  both 
uninteresting  and  perfectly  consistent  with  dismissing  religious  belief  as 
babble or worse. Blackburn assumes that even though he is an atheist, he 
can know what the religionist wants to say. He denies he must lend it any 
credence.
We can go a step further: deliberation yields information about which 
wants we are all willing to permit to be satisfied; in this case secularists and 
religionists  can  come  to  agreement  about  what  everyone  will  permit 
everyone to do. This would be a fortunate outcome of the translation project 
as it would come close to producing what Habermas terms legitimation, the 
condition where everyone agrees about what everyone is permitted and/or 
obligated to do. This is more interesting than simply knowing what others 
want but it is also quite compatible with dismissal of religious belief. That 
we grant each other permissions to say and do things does not imply we 
endorse what  is  said and done.  I  don't  endorse the parents'  harsh and 
public scolding of their child in the supermarket but I don't want to outlaw it 
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either. 
Democratic principle does not require approval of the content of each 
others' beliefs, it does not require agreement in beliefs. Secularists may as 
happily reject belief in the resurrection of Jesus as Christians affirm it, both 
in  complete  compliance  with  democratic  principle.  Of  course,  Habermas 
knows this. The key to Habermas's defense of, and qualified advocacy for, 
religious belief lies in his drawing a distinction which Blackburn also draws 
but to contrary purpose: they distinguish the content of religious assertion 
from the attitudes the assertions evince. Habermas puts the gravamen of 
religious  expression  not  in  the  assertion  of  fact  about  the  world  but 
expression of attitudes towards the world and our place in it.
Onto-theology is the view that religious language purports to be about 
actual facts and actual entities such as that there is actually is non-material 
person, a 'Supreme Being', who creates the world and providentially guides 
our history, rewarding the just and punishing the unjust7. The intellectual 
expression of this ontologically based faith is natural theology with its long 
tradition extending from the Church Fathers over Anselm and Aquinas to 
Alvin Plantinga, William Alston, William Lane Craig and others, who field 
sophisticated  arguments  designed  to  prove,  or  at  least  establish  the 
reasonableness of belief in, the existence of this being. 
Against this,  expressivist theology8 claims religious language is not 
7 Blackburn introduces the term on page 183 of his Religion and Respect essay 
and while he says it  is  “the done thing to distinguish between theology and 
'ontotheology',” he doesn't cite any specific sources. He may have Heidegger 
and Derrida in mind. It is not a foregone conclusion in some quarters that there 
really is such a thing as religious belief. I don't think Wittgenstein thought the 
religious believe in 'religious facts'; Georges Rey argues that is the religious no 
more have 'beliefs'  about  God than we have 'beliefs'  about  Hamlet  or  Jane 
Eyre. (Georges 2001) I assume here religious people do literally believe what 
they say they literally  believe.  Thanks to Mark Wunderlich  for  awakening to 
some problems of belief-attribution.
8 The term doesn't refer to ordinary believers' view of their faith, they tend to be 
ontotheologians,  maintains  Blackburn,  and  I  concur;  imagine  convincing  an 
ordinary Christian that Jesus's bones were excavated in a crypt in Palestine: I  
doubt they would brush this refutation of the Resurrection with the reflection that 
the  Resurrection  was anyway just  metaphor  and  allegory  for  eschatological 
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really assertive or if it is, then that is a superficial characteristic, one that is 
not  what  is  essential  to  it  or  significant  about  it.  What  is  central  and 
significant is that religious language gives expression to attitudes towards 
the world and life, its descriptive or representational content is superficial or 
of  secondary  import.  Belief  'that'  there  is  a  God  may  not  express  a 
proposition so much as the bearing one has for whom, in William James's 
words,  “tragedy  is  only  provisional  and  partial,  and  shipwreck  and 
dissolution not the absolutely final things.” 
In short, there is no theological assertion, only theological allegory. 
Blackburn concedes that religious allegory may give expression precisely to 
attitudes that even atheists like himself revere, “The pieties of the people 
are  human  pieties,  representing  desire,  hope,  disappointment, 
remembrance, attempts to give public meaning to the great events of birth, 
marriage, and death.” (Blackburn 2007, 186). Since it is attitudes such as 
these that are the real subject of religion and not the (allegedly) untenable 
theological  content,  we  certainly  can  respect  individuals'  religion,  their 
religious attitudes that is, while rejecting the literal truth-claims. And thus we 
can preserve the idea that respect for persons may support respect for their 
religion, a kind of 'second-order piety', as Blackburn calls it, a reverence for 
the attitudes underneath the literal  religious claims.  A caring and careful 
response to what is perceived to have intrinsic value is a form of respect 
Kant  called  reverentia,  an  attitude  we have  to  what  we  perceive  to  be 
sacred; Blackburn writes, “To regard something as sacred is to see it as 
marking a boundary to what may be done” (Blackburn 2007, 191). Even 
atheists can admit  the 'sacred'.  Of  course what  they can't  do is  believe 
'sacred' values can have 'eternal' validity, “Principles are not less sacred 
because their duration cannot be guaranteed. Indeed, the very desire for 
guarantees  that  our  values  are  eternal  and  secure  in  some  objective 
heaven is perhaps only  a craving for  the certainties of  childhood or the 
absolute values of our primitive past,” wrote Isaiah Berlin (1969, 171-172)9.
optimism. 
9 Of  course  some  contemporary  moral  realists take  the  'eternality'  or 
'timelessness'  of  moral  values  (rather  the  propositions  stating  them)  for  a 
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Blackburn  offers  a  striking  illustration  which  puts  us  in  position  to 
make sense of  the idea that  we can learn from an attitude:  Suppose a 
corporation  could  permanently  fix  a satellite  in  the  night  sky advertising 
Coca-Cola.  We  would  find  this  abhorrent,  most  of  us;  we  abhor,  says 
Blackburn, the insensitivity of it: “Having the wrong attitudes is as bad or 
worse than having the wrong beliefs” (Blackburn 2007, 192). It is not that 
this  affront  is  “a  crime against  the  night  sky,”  says  Blackburn  as  “The 
cosmos is big enough to take the odd McDonald's advertisement, but we 
are not.” What is amiss is the attitude that would commercialize everything 
and deny people the solace or wonder of the unfathomable. Let's add to 
Blackburn's scenario. Imagine now the ambitious marketing fanatic, at first 
closed off to these considerations and feelings, but who is persuaded at 
long last of their weight, it would be as a revelation to them after which they 
could appropriately speak of having “learned” something they were missing 
before. 
This expanded scenario, I believe,  bears comparison with and can 
illuminate  Habermas's  handling  of  religious  language.  Consider  his 
opposition  to  genetic  'enhancement'  of  the  fetus  where  we  imagine  the 
looming  possibility  that  parents  can  'design'  the  unborn  to  taste,  for 
instance,  manipulating  intellectual  ability,  talents,  physical  features,  etc. 
according  to  the  parents'  fancy  or  self-serving  ideals  and  not  for  the 
therapeutic needs of  the unborn.  Liberal  eugenics erases the heretofore 
fundamental distinction between what one may tamper with and what is 
'Unverfügbar',  in  particular,  it  seriously  undermines  the moral  autonomy 
(self-determination)  of  the  child  itself  since  some  other  individual  has 
disposition over what it will become. 
While  he  says  that  respect  for  autonomy  has  been  basic  to  our 
'species-ethical self-understanding' and the framework of our moral thinking 
presupposes it,  there is no extra-moral argument for adopting the moral 
serious  metaphysical  possibility,  such  as  Russ  Shafer-Landau,  e.g.  in  his 
Whatever Happened to Good and Evil? (88-90). Richard Swinburne and others 
consider  some  moral  propositions  necessary  truths and  thus  eternal,  this 
tradition goes back to Duns Scotus, Aquinas and before. Of course, Blackburn 
will have none of this.
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framework itself. This framework is a  form of life, binding as it were from 
within but not from the outside. With a shudder Habermas contemplates 
slippage into a new cultural form where autonomy plays a lesser role and 
where the line between 'natural' and 'artificial' is erased. He does not think 
the bearers of such a culture are making an 'error' in the sense of implying 
a falsehood or committing a fallacy. But he contemplates the prospect of 
this cultural form with horror and aversion. 
Resistance to these trends requires more than refutation by recourse 
to argument.  The argument that a practice is a threat to autonomy only 
carries weight if you care about autonomy in the first place, and Habermas 
sees no non-circular way to prove that you should care about it: there is no 
point  in  making  a  moral  argument  when  it's  morality  itself  which  is  in 
question. Morally speaking, you ought to care but that may not be sufficient 
motivation. 
But we are still responsive to some attitudes and 'archaic emotions', 
for instance, revulsion at the idea of genetic 'chimeras' but he fears that our 
secular culture lacks a potent language for giving expression and shape to 
these emotions. Here he sees a special place for the 'semantic potential' of 
religious  discourse.  Religion  possesses  “differenzierte 
Ausdruckmöglichkeiten  und  Sensibilitäten  für  verfehltes  Leben,  für 
gesellschaftliche  Pathologien,  für  das  Misslingen  individueller 
Lebensentwürfe und die Deformation entstellter  Lebenszusammenhänge” 
(Habermas 2001,  31) and a “starken Begriff  des Guten.”  Especially  the 
imagery of the Creator/Created relationship,  he maintains, preserves  the 
freedom of  the created person as not  only  does God's  love require the 
freely loving reciprocation of the Created person, but also God's status as 
Creator highlights the necessary parity of one created person with another 
– this harkens back to Adolph von Hartnack's line about the “fatherhood of 
God,  the  brotherhood  of  Man.”  Thus,  the  'translation'  of  the  religious 
(pseudo)assertion  that  we  are  created  by  God  can  impress  on  us  the 
importance of protecting the integrity and autonomy of the child against its 
parents' whims. 
Habermas's approach causes ambivalence on several fronts; I want 
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to address two of them which are closely related, they have to do with the 
epistemological and ontological constraints of his theorizing.
4- Ambivalence in Epistemology
One source of ambivalence arises from a dilemma engendered by the 
notion of 'translation'. Habermas's apologia for religious belief involves the 
notion of  translating what he calls its  cognitive content into appropriately 
secular  language.  For  instance,  the  figure  of  the  relationship  between 
Creator and Creature gets  translated into the language of equality of the 
person of the parents and their children. Now if this is a  translation of a 
religious insight into a secular insight, then it is unclear what is specifically 
religious about it. The special 'categorical' status of the values expressed in 
the religious figure can be expressed in secular language. Blackburn, the 
atheist, also holds the night sky 'sacred'; secular-minded scientists consider 
the integrity of research 'sacred', the non-religious judge may hold the law 
'sacred'. Blackburn's 'second-order' pieties for the human pieties mentioned 
above are not religious per se nor are the first-order pieties of which he 
speaks. They are human piety for human matters. Habermas must answer 
what  is  there  to  learn  from a  religious  casting  of  values  which  cannot 
otherwise be accessed in secular terms. 
This  dilemma of  translation  of  course  is  not  to  deny  that  secular 
citizens can learn from their religious fellow citizens. As mentioned before, 
and trivially, they can learn what their religious co-citizens want to say and 
what  they are willing  to permit  as matters of  public  policy  and morality. 
More interestingly, their religious compatriots may recall them to values that 
are neglected in the secular sphere. One thinks of the biblical intonation 
and  prophetic  gestus  of  Martin  Luther  King  recalling  Americans  to  the 
meaning of 'equality under the law' in ways more likely to stir a nation than 
volumes of Rawls. But this is not adding to secular values, it is motivating 
them  in  an  effective  manner.  It  marks  the  line  Kierkegaard  draws 
separating  the  Socratic  anamnesis or  recollection  from  the  distinctive 
claims of faith and revelation.
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As anamnesis religion is not different from other media such as film, 
stories, poetry, music, or from the real-life practice of morality or political 
and social engagement; they all might have similar – or often even greater 
– motivating effects on individuals and groups. In short, the point cannot be 
that secularists can learn from religious citizens what they already in some 
way know! Habermas's example of genetic manipulation is not especially 
encouraging: the atheist can hold self-determination as 'sacred' (that is, as 
inviolate)  as  the  theist  but  wholly  without  any  talk  about  'creators'  and 
'creatures'.  The  actual  arguments  Habermas  presents  in  his  liberale 
Eugenik (Habermas  2005b)  book  are  all  plausible  wholly  without  any 
religious  reference,  and  couching  them  in  religious  terms  wouldn't 
necessarily  make  them  more  compelling  or  more  illuminating  for  non-
believers. 
And  not  different  from  Kierkegaard,  Habermas  is  staunch  in  his 
insistence that secular reason cannot incorporate revelation. This marks an 
unsurpassable  boundary  for  him10.  For  one  thing,  the  epistemological 
premises  of  his  post-metaphysical  thinking  rule  it  out  as  it  rejects  all 
appeals  to  self-evidence  or  special  intuitions  about  the  nature  of  extra-
mental reality11. Knowledge of a 'transcendent' reality is ruled out ab initio. 
But  then the  project  of  translation  seems doomed to  failure  as  what  is 
specifically  religious  is  specifically  what  cannot  be  smuggled  into  the 
secular  domain.  Habermas's  naturalistic  epistemology  sets  a  limit  to 
10 I focus  on the  epistemological  and  ontological  boundaries  but  Habermas is 
perfectly clear there are limits to 'religious speech' in the political domain; see 
his  contentions  with  Wolterstorff  and  Weithmanin  in  Religion  in  der 
Öffentlichkeit.  Kognitive  Voraussetzungen  für  den  “Öffentlichen  
Vernunftsgebrauch”  Religiöser  und  Säkularer  Bürger,  in:  Zwischen 
Naturalismus und Religion, pp. 139-140. Religious speech is excluded from the 
legislature and from the courts. Although Taylor wishes to woo the secularist 
into acknowledging the validity of religious belief, Habermas and he agree on 
these limits. 
11 Habermas  often  makes  appeals  to  self-evidence  when  it  comes  to  meta-
cognitive or semantic intuitions about what we mean in making moral claims. He 
believes  'conceptual  analysis'  delivers  a priori truths  about  logical  relations, 
semantics and speech-pragmatics (speech-act theory).
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receptivity to the religious.
Related  to  this  is  the  fact  that  the  secularist  has  to  be  carefully 
selective  about  what  she  translates,  or  rather  accepts,  from  religious 
doctrine.  Habermas  finds  intimations  of  autonomy  in  the  monotheistic 
creator/creature  relationship  where  others12 have  found  the  creature's 
radical submission to God's moral authority. He sees in it foreshadowings 
of equality among created persons while others see the basis for glorifying 
arbitrary restrictions such as the subordination of women (St. Paul) or the 
outcasting of divergent sexuality. This is to say the secularist has no choice 
but  to  consider  religious  claims  by  her  own  admittedly  non-religious 
conscience or maybe we should say that qua secularist, she has already 
made her choice.  The choice of  a naturalistic  epistemology has already 
decided against the specifically religious. 
12 Habermas makes no effort,  as far as I  know, to see to what extent actually 
existing  religious  believers  see  matters  this  way;  certainly  American 
monotheism accommodates room for class differences; in this vein Marc Brost 
and Bernd Ulrich write in a recent edition of  Die Zeit (Mehr Staat mit Weniger  
Geld!, 4 August 2011, page 3), “Neoliberale haben ein erotisches Verhältnis zu 
sozialen Unterschieden. Die sind für Liberale eine Feier ihrer eigenen Leistung; 
wenn  sie  religiös  sind,  auch  Vorschein  göttlicher  (Leistungs-)Gerechtigkeit.” 
Perhaps equality  before God has no straightforward translation into  equality 
before the law. Many thinkers espy in monotheism tendencies to egalitarianism; 
Hauke  Brunckhorst  finds  many  precedents  and  reminds  us  of  John  Ball's 
famous sermon at the time of the peasant revolts, “When Adam delved and Eve 
span, Who was then the gentleman?From the beginning all men by nature were 
created alike, and our bondage or servitude came in by the unjust oppression of 
naughty men. For if God would have had any bondmen from the beginning, he 
would  have  appointed  who should  be bond,  and  who free.  And  therefore  I 
exhort you to consider that now the time is come, appointed to us by God, in 
which ye may (if  ye will)  cast  off  the yoke of bondage, and recover liberty.”  
Hauke Brunckhorst cites sources from Peter Bickle's, Von der Leibeigenschaft  
zu den Menschenrechten, and elsewhere and earlier to support his notion of 
“der  (wenigstens  im  Prinzip  der  Gottesebenbildlichkeit)  egalitäre 
Monotheismus.”  H.  Brunckhorst,  Die  grosse  Geschichte  der  Exkarnation 
(unpublished).
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5- Ambivalence in Ontology
Blackburn's  expressivist  interpretation  of  theology  parallels  and 
contrasts with his  expressivist  interpretation of ethical  discourse with the 
difference that while rejecting  expressivism in theology, he endorses it in 
meta-ethics.  On  the  surface  ethical  judgments  look  like  fact-stating 
propositions ascribing, for instance, the property of 'wrongness' to acts of 
cruelty. But this is a misreading of their actual function; “Cruelty is wrong” 
does not state a fact, it expresses an attitude of disapproval. This does not 
mean that moral judgments are arbitrary as the idea stated by “x is wrong 
(merely) because we disapprove of it” itself expresses a moral attitude, an 
attitude, Blackburn says, we generally strongly disapprove of. You might 
call  it  a  'second-order  impiety'.  We deplore  attitudes  that  equate  moral 
attitudes  to  individual  whimsy  or  idiosyncratic  preference.  We  feel  it  is 
morally unacceptable, people shouldn't (morally speaking) think of morality 
that way because it doesn't take the business of morality seriously enough, 
not because there are moral facts underlying our judgments.
Similarly, Habermas treats ethical judgments as ways of expressing 
attitudes, in his case, attitudes urging others, with greater or lesser force, to 
act according to desire or principle. Ethical judgments are wahrheits-analog 
in the sense that their syntax is analogous to the syntax of truth-stating 
propositions.  But  this  should  not  mistake  their  illocutionary  force  which 
defines their real function. Nor does Habermas's prescriptionism mean that 
moral judgments are arbitrary or 'relative' since they can attain impersonal 
validity if our attitudes converge or rather would converge given sufficient 
information, good will and emotional and cognitive acuity. 
A common thread binding Habermas and Blackburn is the insistence 
that  we  determine  right  or  wrong,  by  complex  and  mostly  inarticulate 
schemes of coordination and reflection13. This brings us to the second point 
13 In commenting on the 'narrative of secularity' Charles Taylor writes, “What is 
striking about it is the claim to issue the norms we live by on our own authority.  
This thought can set off a tremor, a frisson in us, as we sense how much we are 
defying  an  age-old  sense  of  higher,  more-than-human  authority;  and  the 
courage we need to take it up.” (Taylor 581) Taylor believes it can also lead to 
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of  ambivalence:  The very  idea  of  God is  incompatible  with  expressivist 
meta-ethics. According to traditional theism God is the foundation of moral 
value, indeed God is in some sense the summum bonum. As William Lane 
Craig puts it:
On the theistic view, objective moral values are rooted in God. He is 
the locus and source of  moral value.  God's own holy  and loving nature 
supplies the absolute standard against which all actions are measured. He 
is by nature loving, generous, just, faithful, kind, and so forth. Thus if God 
exists, objective moral values exist. (Craig 2009, 30)
This is both an ontological and a normative thesis that implies the real 
existence of God. The very fact of God's existence is supposed to prescribe 
to us what we should do - specifically imitate God to the extent humanly 
possible.  God has 'moral magnetism',  to use Bloomfield's  phrase (2001, 
154 & 157), to a preeminent degree. And what this means is that theism is 
committed to the existence of a 'queer' entity or property in Mackie's sense 
of “to-be-pursuedness14” or rather “to-be-emulatedness.” 
But Habermas and Blackburn's expressivist commitments rule out the 
idea that a fact as such can prescribe how we ought to act: (a) God would 
be a 'queer' entity, inexplicable in 'naturalistic' terms to be sure but more to 
the point, (b) God's very being would be normatively prescriptive, the mere 
fact of God's existence would entail how we ought to act or be (c) which 
would trouble our moral self-determination15;  finally (d) given that God is 
dismay  and  uprootedness.  (See  Taylor  on  'narratives  of  self-authorization' 
(especially 588-589.)
14 This seems to be what Sartre means when he calls God an “impossible object 
of desire”. God would unite in one object both being and value; God would be a 
being desirable aside from any motion in the heart of its desirers.
15 The point about 'autonomy' often occurs in discussions of the Divine Command 
Theory according to which what is right is right  because it is commanded by 
God, which puts human moral agents in servitude. For some this is as it should 
be  (see  Peter  Geach,  “The  Moral  Law  and  the  Law  of  God”  (online  at 
<http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/geach.htm>,  originally  in  God 
and the Soul, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969; he follows Hobbes and 
William of Ockham). The  Divine Command Theory, however, is different from 
the  more  subtle  view  Craig  espouses  following  Aquinas  and  Augustine 
according to whom God does not 'command' the Good, God is the Good, that 
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supernatural,  our  knowledge  of  God  would  seem  to  require  special 
cognitive  powers16 which  is  hard to square  with  our  other  beliefs  about 
perception, sensation and ideation. 
Consequently for Blackburn the appeal to religion involves bad faith. 
You  make statements  which  seem to  be  factual  assertions  precisely  in 
order to give your attitudes more normative force, the statements “cement a 
particular way of associating 'ought' and 'is' and insulate it from criticism” 
(Blackburn 2007, 189) If you say that God created woman from Adam's rib, 
or homosexuality is an abomination, or God promised you a patch of land, 
you seem to stand on stronger ground than if you simply disparage women 
or express your abhorrence of gay people or make a landgrab. The 'realist' 
theological talk serves to “sprinkle fairy dust on the transition between 'is' 
and  'ought'”  and  “makes  religious  language  the  power  that  it  is”17. 
(Blackburn 2007, 189).
Like  Blackburn,  Habermas  should  reject  the  idea  of  God  as  an 
impossibility, and not just an improbability or suspended option. Committed 
as  he  is  to  an  expressivist  meta-ethics he  must  reject  the  ontology  of 
theism, the ontological 'queerness' of the entity which is God. Rejection of 
theistic ontology, or at least indifference to it, is in fact wholly in line with 
how Habermas consistently writes, for instance, about the topic of so-called 
liberal  eugenics:  he  doesn't  for  a second  consider  whether  the 'creator' 
actually  exists  and  whether  the  frame  'creature/creator'  names  a 
relationship with a real entity. For him this talk is all allegory, metaphor. 
towards which  the will  would  incline were  it  not  for  the hindrance of  sin  or 
ignorance. 
16 Plantinga's  talk  of  a sensus divinitatis,  following on Calvin's  moral  theology, 
makes the point sound 'spooky', like a kind of God–> Human telepathy. Taylor's 
talk of 'epiphany' is, well, more revealing (Taylor 607). 
17 Can't  the  same  be  said  of  Blackburn's  quasi-realism?  Isn't  dressing  moral 
attitudes up in fact-stating language also a way of sprinkling fairy dust on the 
transition between 'is' and 'ought'? I do not have an answer except to say that 
Blackburn  perhaps  thinks  the  move  is  legitimate  (albeit  often  unjustified)  in 
morality because morality unlike religion doesn't require appeal to non-natural 
entities  and  agents.  Thanks  to  John  Kekes  for  raising  this  question  (in 
correspondence).
Las Torres de Lucca
Nº 0 (enero-junio 2012): 97-119
116 FELMON JOHN DAVIS
However, in his recent work he recommends a kind of methodological  
atheism: the secular thinker is best advised, according to this view, to keep 
an open mind about the question of the existence of God while proceeding 
as if (thus the 'methodological') God did not exist (thus the 'atheism'). Such 
falllibilism is part of any epistemology appropriate to the modern condition: 
all claims are subject to ongoing revision and open to potential refutation. 
Rational  agreement  hic  et  nunc  is  always  just  provisional.  Thus  in  the 
religious context we must keep an ear open to the “semantic potential” of 
religious discourse which may have something to teach us. The secularist 
ought to keep an open door: who knows if the religionist might not turn out 
being right after all is said and done?
But it is wrong to use fallibilism as a wedge in the door for religious 
belief. Fallibilism does not forbid us to consider some views downright false 
– that isn't fallibilism, that's skepticism!18 Fallibilism requires no more than 
the disposition to self-correction or the readiness to change course. By his 
own reckoning what Habermas leaves the door open to is honoring (some) 
religious attitudes, not the contents of religious belief. His  methodological  
atheism ends up being little more than a kind of compliment of politesse: 
their hearts are in the right place but what the religious actually say is false 
(or to be excluded). 
The expressivist can keep an open mind about the existence of this 
entity only on pain of jettisoning expressivism. Thus the expressivist cannot 
maintain  an  attitude  of  openness  towards  the  ontology  of  theism. 
Habermas's position is committed to straight-up atheism, in spite of himself, 
like Blackburn who proceeds more consistently in the matter.
Habermas's  methodical atheism is itself  a limited fallibilism, it  does 
not put his expressivism or rather its associated ontology on the table. The 
expressivist would have to imagine himself in a position analogous to the 
marketing fanatic's, requiring an 'attitude adjustment' in order to see what 
18 I  find  Clayton's  remarks  on  fallibilism  and  Habermas's  choice  of  the  term 
methodological atheism useful in his “The Contemporary Science and Religion 
Discussion” (in:  Scientific  Explanation  and  Religious  Belief:  Science  and  
Religion in Philosophical and Public Discourse. Tübingen 2005.)
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the religious are talking about, “[W]e have to be aware of how believers and 
unbelievers  can  experience  their  world  very  differently.  The  sense  that 
fullness is to be found in something beyond us can break in on us as a fact 
of experience […],” says Taylor19 (Taylor 14). The marketing fanatic has to 
break out of the one-dimensionality of his frame of 'instrumental reason'; 
the secularist  would have to break out of  the flatness (all  horizontal,  no 
vertical dimension) of the 'immanent frame' according to which the different 
structures we live in: scientific, social, technological, and so on, “are part of 
a 'natural', or 'this-worldly' order which can be understood in its own terms, 
without reference to the 'supernatural' or 'transcendent'.” (Taylor 594). That 
means the secularist would have to be open to the possibility that theism 
may be true, and open to the possibility of the real existence and power of 
the 'transcendent', in a word, open to God.
To be fair, there are passages where Habermas seems to consider 
this option. For instance in a pregnant passage he refers to the irruption of 
the 'extraordinary within the everyday' ('Ausseralltägliches im Alltag') which 
resists translation into the secular discourse of philosophy.20 I am not sure 
how to interpret this passage but I think it supports my point that there is no 
19 Taylor defines 'religion' in terms of the distinction transcendent/immanent where 
the 'transcendent' for Taylor as a believer is “the God of Abraham” (Taylor 769); 
fullness refers a sense of meaning beyond the ordinary and immanent (Taylor 
5-12 et passim). The idea religious belief is a matter of experience has a long 
parentage;  contemporary  thinkers  insisting  on  this  include  Plantinga  who 
maintains  properly  basic  beliefs can  include  belief  in  God,  and  Alston  who 
argues God can be an element of experience and perception. 
20 Die  ihrer  Weltbildfunktion  weitgehend  beraubte  Religion  ist,  von  außen  
betrachtet,  nach  wie  vor  unersetzlich  für  den  normalisierenden Umgang mit  
dem  Außeralltäglichen  im  Alltag.  Deshalb  koexistiert  auch  das  
nachmetaphysische  Denken  noch  mit  einer  religiösen  Praxis.  […]  Die  
fortbestehende  Koexistenz  beleuchtet  sogar  eine  merkwürdige  Abhängigkeit  
einer Philosophie, die ihren Kontakt mit dem Außeralltäglichen eingebüßt hat.  
Solange  die  religiöse  Sprache  inspirierende,  ja  unaufgebbare  semantische  
Gehalte  mit  sich  führt,  die  sich  der  Ausdruckskraft  einer  philosophischen  
Sprache (vorerst?) entziehen und der Übersetzung in begründende Diskurse  
noch  harren,  wird  Philosophie  auch  in  ihrer  nachmetaphysischen  Gestalt  
Religion  weder  ersetzen  noch  verdrängen  können. J.  Habermas,  “Motive 
Nachmetaphysischen Denkens”, in: Nachmetaphysisches Denken, p. 60.
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'mediation',  as  Kierkegaard  would  say,  between  the  secular  and  the 
religious  though Habermas's  qualifying  'not  yet'  (vorerst?)  hints  at  some 
perspective from which the horizons of the secular and the religious might 
'merge'. I have to play fallibilist here, granting the possibility but – I don't 
see it. 
Of course 'openness' comes in modes and degrees. Just as respect 
modulo  acknowledging  a  person's  status  as  reason-giver  is  perfectly 
compatible  with  disdaining  the  person  and  dismissing  their  reasons, 
openness  modulo  acknowledging  a  possibility  is  compatible  with 
disparaging  belief  in  it  as  unreasonable,  unfounded,  false.  This  is  why 
fallibilism  stretches  an  empty  hand  to  the  religious  believer  unless  it  is 
combined with a serious offer to see the believer's position as compelling 
on the believer's terms, so it's not 'translation' alone that is called for but 
willingness to contemplate abandoning the secularist standpoint. 
The problem is that the thoughtful secularist needs better reasons to 
reach this far into the other-worldly than comity with fellow citizens, respect 
for  their  status  as  reason-givers  or  awareness  of  one's  own  fallibility. 
Possibly  natural  theology could  deliver  such  reasons  by  proposing 
arguments  and  evidence  of  God's  existence,  and  of  course  there  is 
conviction  gained  through  “a  self-transformation  beyond  the  everyday” 
(Taylor  592),  metanoia,  conversion,  but  otherwise,  from  the  secularist 
standpoint, there is little reason to believe there is something to learn here 
from the faithful. 
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